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TAXATION-FEDERAL lNcoMB TAX-DEDUCTIBILITY oF EXPENSES lNCURRED 
BY AnoRNEY IN ATI'ENDING TAX lNsTITUTE-Petitioner was a member of a £.rm 
of lawyers engaged in general practice in Binghamton, New York. The firm did 
enough work in federal taxation to warrant petitioner's specializing in this field, 
and his partners relied upon him to keep abreast of all significant developments 
in tax law. Petitioner attended the Fifth Annual Institute on Federal Taxation, 
conducted in New York City under the sponsorship of New York University 
and designed exclusively for practitioners and specialists in the tax field. He 
incurred expenses for travel, board, lodging, and tuition, all of which he deducted 
as ordinary and necessary business expenses under section 23(a)(l)(A) of the 
Internal Revenue' Code. The Commissioner disallowed the deduction, and 
his determination was upheld by the Tax Court on the theory that petitioner's 
expenses were non-business ones of a personal nature. On appeal to the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held, reversed. A tax lawyer's expense in 
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attending a tax institute is deductible as a valid business expense. Coughlin 
v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1953) 203 F. (2d) 307. 
Deductibility of a business or professional expense under section 23(a)(l) 
of the Internal Revenue Code hinges not only on the requirement that the 
expense be "ordinary and necessary," i.e., customary in and appropriate to the 
particular business or profession involved,1 but on the further requirement that 
it be incurred in "carrying on" a trade or business, or if a traveling expense, "in 
the pursuit of a trade or business.''2 The relationship between the expense and 
the profession must be sufficiently direct and proximate to prevent its categor-
ization as a nondeductible "personal" expense under section 24(a)(l).3 The 
principal case illustrates how diffuse a line exists between these professional 
and personal expenses when a traveling expense is involved which is chiefly 
voluntary and not legally or financially compelled by the taxpayer's profession. 
While the tax lawyer's deduction was here upheld, other courts have disallowed 
a university professor's research expenses in Europe,4 an attorney's expenses in 
making a European study for the American Bar Association, 5 and the costs to 
an engineer of attending a special evening course to aid him in his occupation.6 
Nevertheless, by considering cases according to one or the other of three lines 
of inquiry, the Bureau and the courts have achieved some consistency in analysis, 
if not in result. First, if the taxpayer's business or profession legally or :finan-
cially demands incurring the expense, deductibility seems assured.7 In the 
principal case petitioner was not under a legal obligation to study the newest 
tax developments, and yet the court found that his moral obligation to do so, 
though falling in the twilight zone between required and purely voluntary 
expenses, was a sufficient equivalent. 8 Had petitioner instead traveled abroad 
to study comparative law, his expenses would obviously have little relation to 
1 For common synonyms of the words "ordinary and necessary,'' see Treas. Reg. 118, 
§39.23(a)-15; Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 54 S.Ct. 8 (1933); Deputy v. DuPont, 
308 U.S. 488 at 495, 60 S.Ct. 363 (1940). 
2 For the pmposes of the present discussion, these are the pivotal words in I.R.C., 
§23(a)(l)(A). 
3 Willard S. Jones, 13 T.C. 880 at 882 (1949). See also 1 P-H FED. TAX SEnv. 
1111,266. 
4Manoel Cardozo, 17 T.C. 3 (1951). 
5 Wade H. Ellis, 15 B.T.A. 1075 (1929), affd. 60 App. D.C. 193, 50 F. (2d) 343 
(1931). 
6 Knut F. Larson, 15 T.C. 956 (1950). 
7 Such was the situation in Hill v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 906, 
where a Virginia statute required that taxpayer attend summer school courses as a pre-
requisite to renewal of her teaching certificate. Some other mandatory professional ex-
penses are itemized in Treas. Reg. ll8, §39.23(a)-5. 
s Just what the moral obligation is equivalent to the court does not specify. Conceiv-
ably the obligation could be "legal" in the sense of being a duty owed to the other partners, 
and yet "financial" in that the petitioner needed to keep his present clients and maintain 
the normal growth of his own practice. Confusion frequently results from the use of the 
word "moral" in legal contexts. 
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the requirements of his professional specialty.9 A second inquiry relates to the 
taxpayer's motive in incurring the expense. The newer cases distinguish be-
tween a purpose to maintain an existing professional status or position, and a 
purpose to advance in rank or attain a new office.10 If the traveling and tuition 
expenses result merely from an attorney's sharpening his tools for continuing 
in his present work, as in the principal case, the connection with pure business 
expenses is very close. On the other hand, it has been said that seeking a new 
and better position, like the purchase of new tools, corresponds more closely 
to the acquisition of a capital asset under section 24(a)(2).11 Since most 
human endeavor is designed ultimately toward advancement, this distinction 
seems somewhat shallow. Perhaps a third procedure, more in conformity with 
the pivotal words of the Code, would be to allow deduction of those expenditures 
for travel and study which have a trade or professional purpose and whose 
benefits will be immediately reflected in the taxpayer's profession with only 
incidental effect on his personal cultural advancement.12 Regardless of the 
particular merits of these three approaches, the upshot is that the deductibility 
of convention or institute expenses may often depend on the subjective motive 
of the taxpayer in incurring the expense together with the use to which he 
puts his newly gained knowledge-factors easily within personal control and 
manipulation. In specific reference to attorneys traveling to bar association 
meetings, several grounds for deductibility can be adduced. For example, the 
general practitioner who attended the 1952 American Bar Association meeting 
could justifiably claim that knowledge and technique acquired through such 
practical discussions as those on corporations, probate and trust law, and mu-
nicipal law aided the carrying on of his particular practice.13 In addition, such 
meetings promote personal contact between practitioners from different areas--
contact which expedites the giving and receiving of referred clients between 
attorneys and furthers the pursuit of their profession. 
John E. Riecker, S.Ed. 
9 A somewhat analogous situation would be that of the university professor who 
studied abroad voluntarily simply to improve his general reputation for scholarship and 
learning, and whose expense deduction was disallowed. Manoel Cardozo, note 3 supra. 
10 While the Tax Court does not seem to have recognized this distinction, it has been 
employed by the Fourth Circuit in Hill v. Commissioner, note 6 supra, and by the Second 
Circuit in the principal case. Shortly after the Hill decision, the Commissioner promulgated 
a bulletin stating in part, "In general, summer school expenses incurred by a teacher for 
the purpose of maintaining her position are deductible . • . as ordinary and necessary 
business expenses, but expenses incurred for the purpose of obtaining a teaching position, 
or qualifying for permanent status, higher position, an advance in the salary schedule, 
or to fulfill the general cultural aspirations of the teacher, are deemed to be personal 
expenses .... " I.T. 4044, 1951-1 Cum. Bul. 16 at 17. 
11 "Reputation and learning are akin to capital assets, like the good-will of an old 
partnership." Welch v. Helvering, note 1 supra, at 115. This capital asset analogy would 
seem defective, however, since "learning" or "position" can hardly be depreciated or sold. 
12 See principal case at 309. 
13 In Wade H. Ellis, note 5 supra, the petitioning lawyer was allowed to deduct his 
expenses in attending an American Bar Association meeting. On the state level, institutes 
such as the 1952 Institute on Michigan Land Title Examination are close parallels to that 
in the principal case and expenses incurred in attending them should similarly be deductible. 
